All arguments based on the causal principal—the assumption that like or similar causes produce like or similar effects—are all arguments from analogy. Any time we’re comparing one thing to another and reasoning that the comparison implies an effect or attribute because the two things must be the same, it’s an argument from analogy. Even when we are thinking about exactly the same object, acting or being exactly the same way it has been in the past, it’s still reasoning by analogy, because the object could have changed in time. When I really got to thinking about it, I was astounded by how much we rely analogical reasoning in everyday life. Every time we flip the light switch in order to turn on the light, or turn on a door-knob and expect it unlatch the door, we’re reasoning by analogy, and essentially any time we expect a certain cause to produce an effect, based on prior experience. I have read about causality a bit before, but I never really considered the profound inescapability of analogical reasoning, or connected causality with analogy. And, I suppose that’s the core principle on which empiricism is based.
One of my favorite and perhaps one of the most popular arguments from analogy is the argument from design for the existence of God, or the teleological argument. This argument gives an analogy which compares the Universe to a product of human design, implying that since the human production was designed by an intelligent mind, so must be the Universe.
A popular example describes a person finding a watch on a remote and uninhabited island. A person making such a discovery would instantly infer that the watch, with its intricate complexity, had a creator, who had left it on the island, rather than assuming it was randomly formed through various physical reactions. This argument compares the analog of a watch, to the target of the universe, or of biological life often in support of the argument for Intelligent Design. According to the analogy, the universe or biological life have complexity comparable to that of a watch, and since watch is designed, this ought to lead us to the inference that the universe or biological life is also designed.
There are countless other versions of the argument, some as simple as saying something like, “Look at the complexity in a single blade of grass and tell me it doesn’t make you think God exists.” Other common analogs are the birth of human babies, the vastness of the universe or beauty of astronomical events, and the perfect balance of the Solar System or physics. Any example that appeals to the complexity, beauty, or elegance existent in the Universe as a reason to imply the reality of a creator or artist behind its existence is an argument from analogy and a variation of the argument from design. For this discussion we’ll use the watch on the deserted island.
Is the watch like the universe or biological life in all relevant respects? If not, it’s a weak analogy and fails to establish the conclusion.
There are several problems with this analogy where the watch does not resemble the universe or biological life in relevant respects.
The point of this argument is to imply that the origins of both the watch, and either biological life or the Universe, or both were created by a designer, because they bear similarities in their complexity.
For further clarification, I’ll discuss the intent of the argument before criticizing it. A watch or any other product of human design and ingenuity can be directly witnessed by humans as being produced by humans and this origin can be attested to. The only reason a person would have for assuming a lone watch had a designer, would be prior experience of the cause of such a thing. Biological life, on the other hand, is directly observed by humans as reproducing itself through sexual or asexual reproduction, while the watch is obviously not. As for the Universe itself, there is no basis of comparison, or of observing the creation of one. But, we can directly observe how individual plants and animals are generated through biological processes, and not by human production. And thus, if we found an animal on a deserted island, we would, based on prior experience, determine it to be born from another animal, and such with all animals we find on the Earth. But, this is not the inference the argument aims to produce, and rather it aims at the ultimate origin of all life, with some advocates asserting that all life came from a singularity of creation, and in this way agrees with evolutionary theory, while others insist that all animals must have been created in their present, or a similar state at some point in history.
Regardless of either of these, through our observations of each biological organism arising from a parent source, we can reason that this must regress to an ultimate or penultimate source. The same can be said for the Universe, but empirical observations of the Universe itself did not lead cosmologists to this conclusion until the mid-20th century. Now that the WMAP radio telescope has uncovered so much about the cosmic microwave background radiation, cosmologists can reasonably say that big bang theory is much more robust, and better at explaining the Universe than steady state theory, or other competing theories about the origin of the universe. But, the idea that we must have this regression to a primary cause, and that this cause is God, is called the cosmological argument, and has its own set of criticisms. Though it seems to be implicated in the teleological argument as outlined here, it is not the target of this discussion. The target here is the whether or not the nature of human designs is analogous to the nature of the Universe, or biological life, such that it establishes their analogous creation.
With no basis for comparison of origins, it is difficult to determine whether or not the origin of biological life can be something akin to the origin of a watch, but this is exactly what the analogy attempts to establish. In the analogy, the analog has a known origin, and the target does not. Surely, seeing so many human beings born of a human mother, we reason, by analogy, that all humans were born of a human mother. But, even so strong an analogy relevant in so many respects could lead us to a false conclusion. Even if all the anatomical parts and physiological systems of the target human were verified to be analogous to that of every other human born of a human mother, as well as all of this target person’s behaviors and whatever other relevant characteristics, it is still conceivable that this person could have been produced in a lab, under the right conditions. Thus, what seemed to be a strong analogy could to an incorrect inference; and it would be foolish to say that the Universe or all biological organisms bear more resemblance to a watch than one human does to another. But, this but this possibility of falsification exists for all analogies, even ones so strong as that if I turn on the light-switch this time, it turns on the light, then when I turn it on next time, it will probably turn on the light—and if that possibility did not exist, as the prevailing philosophy of science holds, it would not be testable and would have no value as an explanative statement that we can apply to reality and use to make predictions. It’s possible, through perhaps not probable, that despite the strength of the analogy, some animals are not born of at least one parent. So, the teleological argument cannot establish the certainty of a designer, but only the probability respective to the strength of the analogy.
David Hume mentions this as he writes, “That a stone will fall, that fire will burn, that the Earth has solidity, we have observed a thousand and a thousand times; and when any new instance of this nature is presented, we draw without hesitation the accustomed inference. The exact similarity of the cases gives us a perfect assurance of a similar event; and a stronger evidence is never desired nor sought after. But wherever you depart, in the least, from the similarity of the cases, you diminish proportionably the evidence; and may at last bring it to a very weak analogy, which is confessedly liable to error and uncertainty.” (Hume, p144).
So how similar is a watch, or human design, to the universe, or a biological design?
Biological life and the universe lack the precise efficiency of human machines. For example, in human sexual reproduction, only one out of millions of spermatozoa will fertilize the ovum, and there is no guarantee that this will happen during sexual intercourse—a fact which I’m sure many people are happy about. Humans attempt to design machines to work as efficiently as possible for their intended purpose. And, surely human intelligence can imagine more efficient ways of reproduction. If a human were to design a machine that was capable of destroying itself while nourishing or maintaining itself, e.g. a human choking while eating, the designer would have taken measures to prevent this, such as separating the opening for ingestion and respiration. This is relevant because, if we are to infer that something is designed by something like human intelligence, we must either explain why such poor or inefficient design elements exist in biological life. Where the Universe is concerned, the same applies. The majority of the Sun’s energy is radiated out into space. Only a tiny fraction of that energy even reaches the Earth, and an even smaller fraction of that is absorbed for life. If all energy is conserved as the constant sum of all energy in the Universe, which is the case as explained by the first law of thermodynamics, this does seem to be an efficient Universe, in a strictly mechanical sense, but not one that is efficient in its use of energy to support life. In a world claimed to be conducive and meticulously designed for the purpose of supporting life, it’s ironic that the majority of the Universe is not just incapable of supporting it, but would instantly destroy it. With biological life, the observation of life forms destroying and competing with each other for energy is not something we would observe with human designs. Creations of human intelligence are designed for purposes that support human endeavors. We would not observe a watch consuming another watch in order to better tell time, or to tell time longer. There other examples of this dissimilarity, in humans as well as other forms of life, and the Universe itself, but for this brief discussion, this is sufficient. This is relevant because we expect creations designed by intelligent minds to be efficient, and this is not the case with biology, or the Universe’s support of life. And since I briefly discussed purpose here, the next dissimilarity I would like to discuss is the dissimilarity of purpose.
Human productions are designed for a purpose to which they are suitable, for instance a car is designed for transportation, or a watch for measuring time. So far the purpose of life has been one of the most subjective topics of debate. One popular view is that people are meant to serve God, but this explanation begs the question, and this does not in itself explain what service entails. Whether or not an attempt is made to explain what ‘to serve God’ actually is, is completely arbitrary then, due to the question begging nature of the original argument. It leaves it up to religious authorities to determine, and how they determine this then becomes a matter of human endeavor. Secular ethicists perform the same function without presupposing a divine purpose for human existence. Another popular view of the purpose of life is that life exists simply to sustain or increase itself, and that this is compatible with a Creator. As commendable as these attempts to reconcile science and religion are, it still brings about a problem with popular conceptions of a creative deity. If purpose could simply be determined in retrospect, by concluding that whatever effects are produced are the ones intended by a designer, would imply that if someone’s mother died in child birth, the designer intended this, or that God intended Adolf Hitler to kill millions of Jewish people, or even that Adam & Eve were meant to cause the fall of humanity, simply because that is what happened—and consistency in reasoning demands that we conclude this. For this reason, Deists take this view of God, but this negates the possibility of God being the authority on human morality. Certain popular stances on the attributes or nature of the deity are not compatible with this view.
Surely we observe biological life to procreate and value its own survival, but to conclude that this is what constitutes purpose is fallacious. The conclusion that things happen as they are intended to happen because this is the only what they can possibly happen can also be shown to be fallacious with any example where one intends to produce one effect, and produces another: E.g. one climbs on a chair to reach for a book on top of a shelf, intending to grab it, and instead falls to the ground. This would have to be said to be the intended outcome of this situation. One could say that it may not have been the individual’s intent, but not God’s, but then as discussed in the paragraph above all effects, no matter how disastrous, would necessarily be intended by God. What if the person broke their neck?
No one will argue the purpose of watch is said to tell time, and that this purpose was formed in the mind of human creators. But, to argue that God intended the watch to tell time seems a bit unnecessary. We already know its purpose as intended by the human intelligence. As no human creator designed biological life for a human purpose, there is still much debate of what its purpose could be, if there be any. And that an intelligent creator is necessary for its existence remains a disputed conjecture.
For the analogy to establish a strong probability that observing order and complexity in life and the Universe, it must be true not just that things humans design are complicated and/or have and order, but that only things which are designed have complexity and order. And, we do observe non biological systems in nature which display complexity and order. There are many examples, some of the most striking of which are in astronomy and physics. The structure and forces involved in an atom, for instance, can be said to be ordered and complex. Some other examples are: the formation of salts, diamonds, or snowflakes, sand dunes, the stock market, the evolution of galaxies, clusters, and superclusters, and the kinetics of gasses. Since complexity and order can be shown to emerge in other systems in nature, if we were to accept the argument, it could also be establishing that biological life, or the universe, emerged from a natural process. And to which does the Universe or biological life show more of a resemblance? To nature’s productions, or to human design?
But, to say that the Universe emerged from a natural process seems a bit strange considering that the necessary conditions, the foundation, the very basis for our nature, moreover for own judgment of design, order, and complexity, exist within the Universe. So, in a way, we are using the parts of the Universe to judge the whole. David Hume also discusses this in the Dialogues:
“But can you think, Cleanthes, that your usual phlegm and philosophy have been preserved in so wide a step as you have taken, when you compared to the universe houses, ships, furniture, machines, and, from their similarity in some circumstances, inferred a similarity in their causes? Thought, design, intelligence, such as we discover in men and other animals, is no more than one of the springs and principles of the universe, as well as heat or cold, attraction or repulsion, and a hundred others, which fall under daily observation. It is an active cause, by which some particular parts of nature, we find, produce alterations on other parts. But can a conclusion, with any propriety, be transferred from parts to the whole? Does not the great disproportion bar all comparison and inference? From observing the growth of a hair, can we learn any thing concerning the generation of a man? Would the manner of a leaf's blowing, even though perfectly known, afford us any instruction concerning the vegetation of a tree?” (Hume, p147)
To accept the conclusion of the analogy would also imply that the designer possessed intelligence something like that of a mind, as we understand our own minds, with intentionality and sentience. And carrying out this analogy fully, as we understand ourselves to be complicated organisms, would this not imply that the designer also is very complicated? And if complicated and ordered things are designed, would this designer also not need a designer to conceive and create its own complexity? This infinite regress criticism also applies to some versions of the cosmological argument.
Say that we accepted the analogy established an intelligent creative force necessary for the existence of the Universe. Even then, strict adherence to the analogy would require us to admit that the most complicated and orderly works of human production have come from years of research from countless individuals, building upon prior thought and discovery. If this is the case with our own designs, why would it not be the case with creative deities? It would seem more reasonable in the case of this analogy that this creator deity drew on the knowledge of others, or perhaps— considering the inefficiencies and supposed design flaws— created a shoddy product.
“In a word, Cleanthes, a man who follows your hypothesis is able perhaps to assert, or conjecture, that the universe, sometime, arose from something like design: but beyond that position he cannot ascertain one single circumstance; and is left afterwards to fix every point of his theology by the utmost license of fancy and hypothesis. This world, for aught he knows, is very faulty and imperfect, compared to a superior standard; and was only the first rude essay of some infant deity, who afterwards abandoned it, ashamed of his lame performance: it is the work only of some dependent, inferior deity; and is the object of derision to his superiors: it is the production of old age and dotage in some superannuated deity; and ever since his death, has run on at adventures, from the first impulse and active force which it received from him. You justly give signs of horror, Demea, at these strange suppositions; but these, and a thousand more of the same kind, are Cleanthes's suppositions, not mine. From the moment the attributes of the Deity are supposed finite, all these have place. And I cannot, for my part, think that so wild and unsettled a system of theology is, in any respect, preferable to none at all.” (Hume, p168)
So even if we are to accept this conclusion for the sake of argument, it does not tell us anything; much less reasonably establish anything about the attributes of the designer. It does not imply infinite attributes, like omniscience or omnipotence, which are rather contradictory to anthropomorphic features.
We can see that, despite the appearance of the analogy, the idea that the argument can establish sufficient characteristics for the deity appeals to ignorance, as it implies that since we do not know exactly how life or the Universe could have originated from something other than an omnipotent deity, the idea must be accepted.
One thing I always thought was funny is that many people associate the reverence they feel for the beauty and elegance in observing certain parts of the Universe with God or religion, but do not make that association when observing things they consider to be disgusting, offensive, or undesirable. It seems to be quite an inconsistency. When looking at pictures of a guinea worm being removed from someone’s leg, why don’t people feel the same awe and wonder, and praise their deity for creating such complex and orderly things, the same way they might when looking at pictures from the Hubble? We could just as easily compare the elegant nature and complexity of a botfly, a mole-rat, or HIV to a design of human creation, but we never see these examples, and I think for good reason. No one wants to attribute things that are considered ugly or terrible to their concept of a perfect being.
The problem of evil is a very powerful criticism of the idea of a benevolent and omnipotent deity, but that requires a separate discussion.
The argument from analogy fails to establish the probability of its conclusion, and several stronger analogies are available, namely the analogy of the operations of natural systems to the Universe, and to biological life. The analogy to the Universe is still weak, in this case, as discussed above. Hume writes, “Now, that vegetation and generation, as well as reason, are experienced to be principles of order in nature, is undeniable. If I rest my system of cosmogony on the former, preferably to the latter, it is at my choice. The matter seems entirely arbitrary. And when Cleanthes asks me what is the cause of my great vegetative or generative faculty, I am equally entitled to ask him the cause of his great reasoning principle…. Judging by our limited and imperfect experience, generation has some privileges above reason: for we see every day the latter arise from the former, never the former from the latter.
Compare, I beseech you, the consequences on both sides. The world, say I, resembles an animal; therefore it is an animal, therefore it arose from generation. The steps, I confess, are wide; yet there is some small appearance of analogy in each step. The world, says Cleanthes, resembles a machine; therefore it is a machine, therefore it arose from design. The steps are here equally wide, and the analogy less striking. And if he pretends to carry on my hypothesis a step further, and to infer design or reason from the great principle of generation, on which I insist; I may, with better authority, use the same freedom to push further his hypothesis, and infer a divine generation or theogony from his principle of reason. I have at least some faint shadow of experience, which is the utmost that can ever be attained in the present subject. Reason, in innumerable instances, is observed to arise from the principle of generation, and never to arise from any other principle.”
And so demonstrates how the generation of biological life can seen to produce reason, but not reason to produce life, giving us greater reason to believe that we can extrapolate this principle to the whole without as much risk of error.
It seems to me that the predisposition to attribute the Universe to design rests on some kind of hubris, which is also Discussed by Hume, as he mentions the Brahmin myth that the world was spun by a spider, which seems absurd. But, he suggests, that it may not seem so absurd to a world inhabited by spiders. By this analogy he suggest that our most distinguished and perhaps most highly valued ability, reason, has been exalted to the status of creative deity, simply because we value it so highly.
All in all, the analogy is weak, and fails to sufficiently establish the probability of its intended conclusion.
Hume, D. (n.d.) Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. http://www.anselm.edu/homepage/dbanach/dnr.htm
